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This article integrates William James’ (1890) theoretical model of Self with contemporary theoretical 
discourse and recent research on the impact of digital technology upon the Self.  An overview of James’ 
self-theory is presented and followed by a detailed review of contemporary publications on self in our 
increasingly digital world; organized around the Spiritual, Social and Material realms of James’ “Me”. 
This is followed by this author’s extension of James’ concept of “I” into contemporary discourse on the 
person in terms of authenticity, agency and power. It is shown that the “Spiritual Self” is reflected in 
technology as fragmented, decentred and dislocated while the “Social Self” has expanded into virtual 
communities; continuing to seek recognition from others, but in a magnified and accelerated fashion. A 
cultural shift has been identified towards one of simulation and surveillance. Transformations of the 
“Material Self” in terms of physical bodies, interaction with the material world, and with material others, 
are presently observed. This author’s conceptual and theoretical exploration has also shown a 
corresponding loss of control and fracturing of the status of the person through the rise of surveillance 
and loss of personal rights that challenges the theoretical construct and everyday experience of persons.  
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This article examines the impact of computers and digital technology on the contemporary self. 
It begins with an overview of William James’ (1890/1950) self-theory and examines the 
Spiritual, Social, and Materials selves along with the “I”, or ego. This is followed by a more 
detailed examination recent publications on self and digital technology as they apply to James’ 
theoretical model of self. It begins with changes to the Spiritual or psychological self, followed 
by a discussion of impacts on the Social self along with the growth of virtual cultural 
communities. Next is a presentation of the ways in which digital technology has impacted the 
Material self through its influence on our bodies, our relationships to the material world and 
material “others” in that world. This article finishes with this author’s analysis of the impact of 
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digital technology on the “I” as person by examining the ontology of persons and issues of 
ethics, authenticity, agency and control. 
The Construct of Self 
Self-understanding and self-theory have been around since the dawn of civilization, something 
that has been well documented since 1500 BC in India (Paranjpe, 1998) and over the centuries in 
western philosophy (Taylor, 1989). Paranjpe (1998) provides a comparative history of both 
affirmations and denials of self in Indian and European philosophy and psychology, while also 
identifying the distinction between self and personhood. In modern times, the model of self 
according to William James (1890/1950) offers a foundation from which contemporary 
development in self theory can be examined (Hermans & Hermans-Konopka, 2010). 
James’ (1890/1950) model has two primary components, the subjective “I”, or stream of 
consciousness, and the objective “Me”, which in turn, has three principal components that are 
experienced by the “I” through self-feelings (emotions) and attachments to various components 
of “Me”. The “Me” is comprised of the Material, the Social, and the Spiritual selves, where 
James states: 
 
a man's Self is the sum total of all that he CAN call his, not only his body and his psychic powers, but 
his clothes and his house, his wife and children, his ancestors and friends, his reputation and works, his 
lands and horses, and yacht and bank account (1890/1950, p. 291, italics original). 
 
The Material Self is made of one’s body and one’s sense of being physically embodied and 
attached to material possessions like one’s clothes, house, lands, animals, tools and technology. 
The Spiritual Self entails one’s thoughts and “inner subjective being .… a reflective process” (p. 
296) that exists dialectically with the “I”, as a “felt” acquaintance of ownership of one’s 
thoughts, ideas, and imaginations. 
Arguably the most complex constituent of the self for James, the Social Self is not merely 
grounded in one’s conscious experience, but also is manifest in the surrounding social 
communities with whom one participates. He states that: “[a] man’s Social Self is the recognition 
which he gets from his mates” (p. 293, italics original) where we have “an innate propensity to 
get ourselves noticed, and noticed favorably, by our kind.” (p. 293).  The Social Self is also 
multifaceted, where: “[p]roperly speaking, a man has as many social selves as there are 
individuals who recognize him and carry an image of him in their mind. To wound any one of 
these his images is to wound him” (p. 294, italics original). Additionally, James states that “we 
may practically say that he has as many different social selves as there are distinct groups of 
persons about whose opinion he cares” (p. 294, italics original). Thus, the Social Self is in the 
recognitions one receives from others as well as the perspectives, attitudes, and ‘common sense’ 
that are shared with others in communities and social life. Moral evaluation of the person is also 
part of the Social Self for James where he states that “[a] man’s fame, good or bad, and his honor 
or dishonor, are names for one of his social selves.” p. 294, italics original). This is where the 
self and “person” merge, where the person is part of a socio-moral tradition recognized to have 
rights and responsibilities (Paranjpe, 1998; Taylor, 1989).  
While James fashioned this modernist model of self against the historical  tradition of self in 
western philosophy highlighted by Locke, Kant, and Hume (Paranjpe, 1998), one can easily find 
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it relevant to contemporary, post-modern times (Hermans & Hermans-Konopka, 2010; Tonks & 
Bhatt, 2016). With this in mind, a more detailed examination of the application of James’ model 
of self follows, centering on the contemporary influences on the self by digital technologies.  
The impact of computers on self 
This section integrates a review of early 21st century scholarly publications on the self in our 
digital age with James’ self-theory and other contemporary theory on: self, community, culture 
and materiality. While the author presents many of the positive benefits of digital technologies 
on the Jamesian self, many negative effects are also presented. 
“New technologies shape our identities by providing us with a different perception of the world” 
(McLuhan, 1964/1994; quoted by Rosenfeld, 2015, p. 69). In her book on the Virtual Self, Nora 
Young (2012) describes how, for centuries, technology in many forms of measurement and 
accounting (i.e. diaries, calendars, clocks, and computers) has fostered a transformation of self. 
Effectively, these technologies enable the development of a “mirror” of self, one that provides 
opportunities for change and alteration (Turkle,1984, 1995, 2011, 2015).  
Various psychologists and sociologists have recognized the effect of “mirrors” or representations 
on our self-development. Charles Cooley (1902/1964) was a leader in the field where he 
described the “looking-glass self” that is developed in relation to how we are reflected through 
the eyes of others and what other people think about us (Paranjpe, 1998). Essential to this process 
are: imagining our appearance to others; imagining their judgment of that appearance; and a self-
feeling (i.e. pride or mortification) about each (Rosenfeld, 2015). The impact of computers as a 
looking-glass has transformed many facets of the self and its social relations in communities 
(Turkle, 1995, 2011, 2015), as well as its relationship with the material and virtual worlds 
(Young; 2012; Rosenfeld, 2015).  
The spiritual / psychological self 
Clearly the most prolific scholar on the impact of computers on our sense of self over the past 40 
years has been Sherry Turkle (1984), who began in the 1970s to analyze human computer 
interactions and the emergence of a “Second Self”. She offers a developmental model of the 
impact of computers on self and identity beginning with gaming and programming. Her 
developmental analysis is built on the stages of metaphysics, mastery, and identity formation in 
describing how children and adolescents respond to computers. Young children, she contends, 
interact with computers in a metaphysical manner, acting as though the machines are alive. Older 
children come to take mastery over computers through learning to program and interact with 
them, eventually to come to develop their identity (Erikson, 1968), by “thinking through” the 
machines and gaining self-understanding by having their identity objectified or “mirrored” in the 
machines. 
Turkle (1995) describes how people create new personae in their online games and multi-user 
domains, being able to alter one’s attributes, including their gender. Resulting from this, she 
contends that “the self is multiple, fluid, and constituted in interaction with machine 
connections” (Turkle, 1995, p. 17, italics added). This interaction gives rise to a heterotopia, 
which is “a mix or joint experience” (Rosenfeld, 2015, p. 76) that arises through looking into a 
mirror. Based upon Foucault’s example, this experience is both existentially real in the moment 
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of embodied looking into the mirror, and unreal requiring one to travel to some other virtual 
point in the mirror. Such heterotopias lead to a fracturing of perspective of self and are 
accelerated by the use of computers to digitally construct idealized images of self and others 
through social media (Rosenfeld, 2015).   
Turkle (1995) argues that computers provide a grounding of the “post-modern aesthetic” in 
everyday life, giving rise to a “protean self” that is non-linear, opaque, multiple, fractured, and 
shifting from context to context (Lifton, 1993). She raises the possibility that this state could fall 
to the extreme of Multiple Personality Disorder (MPD) but may be recentralized as in Jung’s 
model of self as a complex of archetypes. Here, in describing this multiplicity of self, Turkle 
(1995) suggests that a core identity is still possible; something like having a “home page” with 
hyper-links to other facets of self. This proliferation of selves is also recognized as the fluid 
“dialogical self” that is de-centered and distributed across a matrix of shifting positions 
(Hermans & Hermans-Konopka, 2010).  Such positions are woven together to produce self-
narratives, where self, or identity is built through, and sustained by, narrative story-telling while 
integrating external events (Rosenfeld, 2015).  
The narrative nature of the digital self is seen with “the self as reflexively understood by the 
person in terms of his or her own biography” (Tredennick, 2008, p.52). The self has continuity 
despite a constant reconstruction as “a negotiation between our past and our present” (p. 52), 
where this dialogical self is socially co-constructed through the play of language and 
communication games (Vitanova, 2010). Traditionally, self and identity were constructed 
through the interactive mutuality of physical and social play in real life (Erikson, 1950, 1968; 
Tonks, 2019), while today they are socially constructed through texting, social media, interactive 
online play, and story-telling. With this shift from Real Life (RL) reality to Virtual Reality (VR) 
identity formation occurs through interaction with an accelerated number of players within a 
multiplicity of cultural contexts, leading to a proliferation of multiple identities for each self 
(Turkle, 2011; Rosenfeld, 2015).  
The Social Self  
Digital technology has had a significant impact on the Social self, ranging from recognitions and 
reputations that others have of one’s self as well as the shared attitudes and opinions of virtual 
social and cultural communities (Tonks & Bhatt, 2016). Social media and communication have 
clearly had a positive benefit to millions globally through forming social connections and the 
development of online communities, as experienced during the COVID-19 pandemic, however, 
many negative outcomes have also been reported. 
According to Turkle (1984; 1995; 2011) the transition from gaming and bulletin boards to chat 
rooms, and then social media, has provided a means through which people can judge others and 
be judged by others. People are judged by their electronic selves in terms of what they post to 
their profiles showing what they think, how they look, what they are doing, and at what locations 
they are visiting.  With the development of social media, people have come to “friend” or accept 
others as followers; evaluate and be evaluated through “likes” or “loves”, or by being trolled, 
blocked, or de-friended. James states that “[n]o more fiendish punishment could be devised, … 
than that one should be turned loose in society and remain absolutely unnoticed by all the 
members thereof. …[where they] ‘cut us dead’” (1890/1950, p. 293).  
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Lyon (2018) describes a further transition from gaming to surveillance that is built upon this 
“scophillia” or “love of being seen” (p. 122). People have developed a performative and 
confessional self that is “both the triumph and betrayal of privacy” (Lyon, 2018, p.130), by 
blurring boundaries in the shift from private to public life. Social media accelerates and 
magnifies the performative, presentational, and confessional self where everyone has become an 
online actor and voyeur, subject and object on display that is subject to admiration and praise as 
well as criticism and trolling (Turkle, 2011; Rosenfeld, 2015). Engaging in social media pushes 
people towards transparency and openness of self-presentation (Rosenfeld, 2015), where there is 
growing pressure to disclose and become a fully transparent self, as seen in contemporary 
narratives such as the book The Circle and the Netflix program Black Mirror (Lyon, 2018).  
The rise of virtual cultures  
Virtual communities and cultures can be understood through the ontological categories of 
knowledge, space & time, and embodiment that are foundational to real life communities 
(Willson, 2006). They are built upon social norms, values, and attitudes that form the basis of 
bonding, commonality, and reciprocity central to natural communities. Communities can also be 
understood in terms of the historical periods of the Traditional, the Modern and the Post-Modern 
(Willson, 2006). The Traditional is grounded in place and history; identity is unchosen and 
embodied and developed through face-to-face relations (Willson, 2006). The Modern shows a 
shift to increased choice where one can have a multiplicity of community identities that are 
grounded in a stable sense of time and space. Identities are mediated through institutional forms 
and are organized around more extended communicative relations. The Post-Modern involves 
extended choice and flexibility of identity, free from the embodied or geographic location. 
Further, identity is mediated through technology and abstract integrative practices, making it 
primarily disembodied and dislocated. Willson states that “[t]ime becomes experienced as 
immediate and compressed, multiple and fragmented, yet easily accessible and traversable” 
(2006, p. 39). She also cites Marshall McLuhan, who identified the technological shift from 
acoustical space (which is intimate and subjective) to “visual space [which] enables detachment 
and objectivity” (2006, p. 72). This is also echoed by Young (2012), who describes the 
technological creation of a hyper-connected and remote social world as one that dislocates time 
and space. “New technologies enable not only speed but acceleration, which in makes mobility a 
basic feature of life changing the relationship between space and time” (Lyon, 2018, p. 167, 
italics added).  
These shifts in space and time are features of the emergence of digitally abstracted realities. 
Rosenfeld (2015) provides a detailed analysis of a spectrum of ontological realities ranging from 
Real-Life reality to Hyper-Reality.  In between these extremes are the increasingly abstracted 
worlds of Simulated-Reality, Augmented-Reality, and Virtual-Reality.   
Simulated reality has been around for centuries in the forms of art, literature, and other 
representations of human life and lived experience. Turkle (1995) identifies the growth of a 
culture of simulation that begins with television media and consumer culture as observed in 
visiting shopping malls and Disneyland; while now interactive computers provide a simulation of 
life and the possibility for re-writing one’s self and identity in myriad ways. Based upon 
ethnographic interviews, Turkle (2011) reports that people have come to prefer intimacy at a 
distance through simulated experiences and relationships, even though this gives rise to feelings 
of isolation and abandonment, and disruptions to traditional social relations (Waters, 2019).  
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Rosenfeld (2015) identifies the further emergence of augmented-reality which is more common 
today, as seen in using one’s phone to view online reviews to find a good restaurant or to 
virtually ”try on clothes”. Virtual-reality involves a more abstracted and immersed experience of 
not only seeing abstracted information blended with real life, but the opportunity for individuals 
to interact with and manipulate the virtual world they are experiencing. Such technology can be 
used to help amputees to relieve their phantom limb pain as well as to train people in overt motor 
skills. Hyper-reality takes human consciousness and identity into full immersion in computer 
generated realities, experiencing them as realty, as in the films The Matrix and Avatar. 
Human lived experience transcends and navigates through these realities, with people living 
“virtually” online and creating virtual communities and cultures. Resulting from these virtual 
worlds is the emergence of digital online cultures as well as virtual cultures that exist in parallel 
with real life cultures.  
Contemporary digital information cultures are built upon textuality, as seen through websites, 
blogs, email, and messaging. These formats give rise to shared narratives of the values and 
norms of both real and virtual cultures (Tredennick, 2008). Self and identity are influenced by 
digital communities and cultural industries that give rise to the development of mythologies and 
narratives of personal experience. These narratives reveal our human values and normative 
expectations of action online and in everyday life. Such historically shared narratives of self and 
society can be described as mythemes that guide social action and self-development (Boesch, 
1991). Mythemes are central to cultural life and offer narratives of folk stories and social action 
in the form of myths, counter-myths and trans-myths (Valsiner, 2014).  Self and identity are 
shaped by myths and counter-myths where participation in such mythemes provides a person 
with a field of meaning, including meaning of one’s identity. Such mythemes are found in 
cultural dramas where a “person cannot escape from the field of dramatized events” (Valsiner, 
2014, p. 102), and have their identities inevitably shaped by those dramas. The role of trans-
myths is to transform society; trans-myths around computers and technology abound, commonly 
around how computers transform the self, transform society, and transform life itself in both 
utopic and dystopic visions. 
Rosenfeld (2015) identifies the role of such mythologies in identity, education and society. 
Media portrayals of identity and moral action demonstrate shared values and expectations of 
normative action. Lyon (2018) describes how digital technology has given rise to a culture of 
surveillance through the processes of performance, compliance and normalization. Building 
upon Charles Taylor’s (2004; 2007) notion of “social imaginaries” or “moral orders”, Lyon 
shows how we have come to develop surveillance imaginaries, or expectations about 
surveillance and how and why we live with it. Beginning with the fun and play of gaming, and 
later through an introduction of fear from “911”, there has been a proliferation of surveillance 
where today it is all too familiar in the forms of everyday and ordinary surveillance (i.e., loyalty 
cards, security cameras & social media). Lyon states that “to engage with surveillance culture is 
to ask about hearts and minds, everyday attitudes and actions, as well as to analyse technologies, 
profits or policies” (2018, p.173).  
Rosenfeld (2015) echoes this concern over “America’s general acceptance of surveillance” (p. 
106) where what was once thought to be extraordinary is today ordinary and routine. The push 
for transparency through surveillance is tied in with the neoliberal consumerist narrative. It 
guides people to become more open in their self-transformation; documented through technology 
and shared with others to become a happier and better person. Agger (2004) offers neo-Marxist 
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critique of the impact of computers on self and society, largely against the role of capitalism 
where the internet has become a cultural industry that promotes consumerism and “self-
production” through the creation and promotion of consumer “needs” for commercial and 
political manipulation. Edward Snowden (2019) further warns us about the wrongful use of 
surveillance where corporations and governments are collecting “big data” and engaging in data 
analytics to control consumers, to control voters, and to control citizens. Rosenfeld (2015) shows 
that surveillance culture is also accompanied by counter surveillance cultures as with the case of 
first-generation hackers and more recently cyber-activists like Anonymous. This will be 
considered in more detail in the final section of this article. 
The Material Self 
While, as indicated above, the impact of computers on the self has led to a “disembodiment” and 
dislocation of self, it is also apparent that our material selves have been altered in three principal 
manners. First, digital technology has had an impact on our physical bodies including health 
benefits and liabilities. Second, we have begun to physically merge with digital technology, or 
engage in “hybridization”, through wearable technologies and bionics. Third, we have changed 
our relationship with real life material others through our relationships with devices, robots, and 
the internet of things.  
Reflecting on the disembodiment of our materials selves, Turkle (2011; 2015) reports that people 
want to avoid talking on the phone, which is seen as revealing too much information or being too 
intrusive; rather, people prefer the more distant and controlled “social” interaction of texting or 
using social media. Young (2012) says that people need to use digital technology critically and 
consciously otherwise “surrendering ourselves to a disembodied distracted self” (p. 5). Miller 
(2012) refers to this digital disembodiment as a crisis of presence based upon a metaphysical 
stance of being-in-the-world promoted by on-line living, something that Dreyfus (2001) 
identifies as a threat to our primordial embodied “grip on the world” (p. 55).   
Impact on our bodies  
Human bodies have been impacted by digital technology in many ways, including our activity 
levels, body weight, sleep, and emotional reactions. Turkle (2011) describes a rise in anxiety due 
to be being “always on” or connected to digital technology and from being under scrutiny or 
surveillance. Marshall McLuhan stated that “[w]e have to numb our central nervous system when 
it is extended and exposed, or we will die. Thus the age of anxiety and electric media is also the 
age of the unconscious and of apathy” (quoted, in Young, 2012, p. 84). Others have shown 
various impacts on our bodies, mental and physical health, such as a rise in anxiety and 
depression due to social media use (Elhai, Hall & Erwin, 2018). Young (2012) refers to Linda 
Stone’s description of “Email Apnea” where engagement with digital technology affects our 
breathing, while others describe the impact on sleep interruption (Twenge & Campbell, 2019). It 
has further been identified that night time use of cell phones gives rise to excess body weight, 
poorer diet quality, and lower physical activity (Chahal, Fung, Kuhle & Veugelers, 2012), and an 
increase in stress and attentional deficits (Waters, 2019).  Recently, during the COVID-19 
pandemic many people report Zoom fatigue from too much time in online streaming meetings. 
We have yet to observe the impact on health from binge watching, although it has been studied 
as an addictive behavior (Alter, 2017; Riddle, Peebles, Davis, Xu & Schroeder, 2018). Alter 
(2017) reveals key behavioral techniques for developing addiction to digital devices and their 
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content. Aside from these negative impacts of technology on our bodies and health, many 
positive benefits from technology have been established such as heart and fall monitoring among 
cardiac patients and seniors. These technologies have also been used to monitor diabetes (Katz, 
Mesfin & Barr, 2012) and have been used for clinical diagnosis and gamified treatment of 
depression and anxiety (Arean & Cuijpers, 2018). 
Hybridization: Quantifying and interfacing the self 
Prostheses and other medical devices attached to the body have been around for centuries, 
however, digital technology devices have led to an accelerated change in our sense of self, 
embodiment, and materiality. Turkle (1995) examines the proliferation of “mind altering” 
biofeedback devices such as goggles, headphones, and helmets, that have since become 
commonplace in the form of “wearables”. This has led to the development of a virtual self that 
has expanded and flourished through the use of wearables and the self-tracking (quantified self) 
movement (Young, 2012). Recent development of portable, ready-to-hand, mobile technologies, 
with smaller sensors has enabled people to record and share their experiences for self-
enhancement or recognition on social media. As such, a growing number of people are having a 
‘data-driven’ life in contemporary augmented reality where people can easily track their 
behaviour and bodily attributes, athletic performances, mood and mind states, health and 
wellness (Young, 2012).   
Aside from these many new health benefits, the online sharing of one’s performances or 
recorded achievements, such as the number of steps they have taken in a day has also increased. 
Self-tracking has led to the creation of “digital doppelgangers”, online doubles about which some 
people have become obsessed. This is the case of the online publication of the Felton Annual 
Report, a complete digital record of all everyday events in the life of Nicolas Felton (Young, 
2012). Such personal data banks also give rise to aggregate data from a variety of people that is 
used to create data maps to track disease-spread, crime-rates, and consumer habits (Young, 
2012). This will be examined in more detail in a later section. 
People have also come to reap the benefits of devises that allow augmented experiences such as 
using google maps to navigate a city in real life or making notes to enhance one’s memories; 
dividing attention on two or three parallel activities (Rosenfeld, 2015). The accelerated use of 
external digital technology has been accompanied by a proliferation of internal or bionic implant 
devices that many people rely upon to maintain or enhance their lives.  Rosenfeld (2015) refers 
to all of these as the formation of a technomensch, a computer-human coevolution where “our 
sense of self is mediated through cyberspace, presentational media, … smart phones, …. where 
hyperreality is reality and we no longer live on the other side of the mirror as Foucault argues but 
rather the other side of the mirror no longer exists” (p. 88). This merging of what has been 
parallel living of the self and the mirrored self gives rise to the possibility of the emergence of 
transhumanism, human-body-electronic melding or even posthumanism with the emergence of 
new cyborg species. 
Material others in real life   
How we interact with the material world has also been impacted. In North America, there has 
been an explosion of the use of technology to acquire goods and services, such as food from Skip 
The Dishes, flights and hotels with Expedia or Air BnB, getting home with Uber, or shopping at 
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Amazon. As we find ourselves in the midst of the COVID-19 outbreak and isolation protocols 
have been invoked, many of these services have vastly expanded and it seems that nearly every 
other shop or service has gone online, many with free home delivery.  
Over the last decade there has been a marked shift in people’s relationships with material objects 
where, for example, many people no longer collect physical CDs but rather download music 
from iTunes or listen to it streaming through Spotify which makes up 80% of the music market 
today. Turkle (1984) alternatively shows how through early home computer kits, and the 
development of programming and hacking, individuals came to “make the computer their own”, 
stylized and tailored to their own needs. She further discusses the attachment or feelings people 
have for the electronic devices as part of the “holding power” of interactive devices to grab our 
attention and direct our actions (Turkle, 1995). The strength of attachment that people have to 
their cell phones has been described as “nomophobia”, the fear of being without mobile phone 
contact (Alter, 2017).  Not only is there a growth of attachment to such material possessions, the 
neo-liberal consumerist culture of today promotes disposal and acquisition of the latest devices 
with newest features and capabilities.   
Adam Alter (2017) identifies the intentional development of addiction to technology through the 
behavioural principles of: compelling goals just beyond reach, unpredictable positive feedback, 
incremental progress, unresolved tensions, and strong social connections. This often makes use 
of gamification combined with portable technologies, making them “irresistible”. He notes that 
Steve Jobs helped to develop such technology while prohibiting his own children from using it. 
Social media provides endless feeds and notifications on what one might be missing out on, 
while Netflix also incorporates these principles with episodes ending in unresolved conflicts 
along with “post-play” that automatically loads the next episode of a series, bringing temporary 
resolve.  
Some material objects have risen to the status of material “others” with which arise sophisticated 
and complex human-machine relationships. Turkle (2011) further describes the intimacy that we 
seek with and through our devices as involving some projection and transference of our needs 
and wishes onto them. She shows this through reports of people’s experience with robotic pets, 
robotic assistants, robotic nurses and even robotic sexual partners. She provides many cases of 
when robotic pets become non-functional, their owners would refuse to reset them to “start over” 
but would rather leave them for dead, often having robot funerals.  
Turkle (2011) identifies the “creation of a thou” in robots that raises the question of authenticity 
of human relationships with robots. She also raises the question of consciousness in robots which 
blurs the boundaries between creator and created, programmer and programed. Similarly, Lyon 
(2018) draws from Levinas in examining alterity in dealing with the internet of things, including 
smart phones, smart televisions, smart streets and smart cities. What is missing from most of 
these encounters, however, is the crucial exchange of “faces”. Robot makers in Japan are now 
working on those features to provide facial feedback from robotic others (Okada, 2017). Willson 
(2006) also examines the “I-thou” of inter-subjectivity within virtual communities along with 
identity and authenticity. Through such authentic exchanges between persons, responsibility by 
and for each other emerges (Lyon, 2018). 
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The person in the stream     
This paper has examined the objective self or “Me”, as it has been impacted by computers and 
digital technology. It will now consider the manner in which the subjective self, the “I”, the ego, 
or the person has been impacted. James’ (1890/1950) subjective self, or “I” as stream of 
consciousness, is comprised of the characteristics of: being personal, constantly changing, and 
having a continuity of experience with intentionality and choice.  When examining the 
relationship of James’ self as “I” with electronic devices and digital technology, we can consider 
the issues of: personhood, authenticity and ethics, control and power over persons.  Here, this 
author enhances James’ theory with contemporary theoretical analysis of persons and 
personhood. 
Paranjpe (1998) identifies the basis of personhood as the trilogy of mind which involves 
cognition, conation and affect. Here, like with James, personhood is tied to an embodied 
consciousness that has the capacity to think clearly, to have appropriate emotional responses, and 
to make volitional choices. The conception of a person has also been recognized as an 
identifiable, embodied being with self-understanding and agency capability (Martin, Sugarman 
& Hickinbottom, 2010). These essential components indicate that a person must be a living 
individual agent  who is historically and culturally influenced, one who possesses an 
understanding “that discloses and extends a person’s being and activity in the world” (Martin et 
al., 2020, p. 2). These characteristics are considered when judging the legal status of persons and 
the granting of rights and responsibilities (Paranjpe, 1998). 
As described above, Turkle (1984) states that a decentering revolution has occurred in terms of 
the impact of computers on how we think of ourselves, similar to the revolution in 
psychoanalysis. She states, however, that neo-Freudians rescued the ego back from Freud’s 
decentering and that it remains unclear what will happen with the computer’s enduring attack on 
“I”. Turkle (1995) further looks to Robert Jay Lifton (1993) for solutions, where one could: (1) 
return to traditional dogmatic unity, (2) turn to religious fundamentalism, or (3) embrace the 
fragmented self. This is the route for Hermans and Hermans-Konopka (2010) who posit that the 
post-modern self is no longer the unitary self of William James, but rather a dialogical self-
represented by multiple “I”-positions. In Dialogical Self Theory, each person takes on multiple 
“I-positions” or stances through which one interacts with others (Hermans & Hermans-Konopka, 
2010). With the fracturing and multiplication of the “I” from computers, there is a blow to 
personhood where the ascription and recognition of rights and responsibilities to the person is 
obfuscated with no singular agent to be held ethically and legally responsible (Lyon, 2018).  
Vittanova (2010) identifies the social construction and interpretation of multiple narratives of the 
dialogical self as: “I-for-myself”, “I-for-the-other”, and “the-other-for-me”. Self-awareness is 
developed in part through “the eyes of the other” as one creates narratives of self through 
interaction with others. Lyon (2018) identifies visibility as the basis of recognition for formation 
of personhood, “looking into the eyes of the other” (p. 178), something that has been altered by 
digital technology, particularly by social media.   According to Miller (2012) online life 
diminishes face-to-face presence which is central to the recognition of, and ethical responsibility 
towards, others. This loss of presence reflects the shift from being subjective beings exchanging 
glances to becoming objects viewed from a distance. This too marks a loss of personhood devoid 
of subjective exchange and mutual recognition. 
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Turkle (2011) provides numerous examples of where consciousness is perceived to exist within 
digital technology. With the development of robots and artificial intelligence, she contends that 
we are forced to contemplate not only our own personhood, but also that of our devices. She 
identifies the question of aliveness and the prospect of “the singularity” unfolding. Should forms 
of artificial intelligence or robots acquire the capacities of cognition, conation, and affect, they 
may be considered persons. Likewise, with the development of digital doppelgangers, what is 
their place in the world of ethics and personhood? This raises the issue of the authenticity and 
identifiability of which is the real person, the one to be recognized, given rights, and held 
morally and ethically responsible. 
Willson (2006) identifies Charles Taylor’s (1991a) “ethics of authenticity” along with the 
ideology of autonomy as being central to the moral orders of many contemporary communities. 
While the contemporary social order commonly views authenticity with an emphasis on 
“individual and particularistic needs, desires, and rights – self-fulfillment” (Willson, 2006, p. 
121), Taylor argues that there needs to be a greater recognition of “authentic communities.” 
Here, authenticity of the person is in part understood through one’s participation in a community 
and how one is recognized and acts reciprocally. Lyon (2018) identifies recognition and 
responsibility as central to the management of persons in the emerging surveillance imaginaries. 
These are essential for recognizing specific persons and applying or withdrawing their rights 
(Lyon, 2018; Taylor, 1994).  
While acknowledging the traditional forms of surveillance by governments and police forces for 
establishing control over persons, Lyon (2018) states that we are now in a time of liquid 
surveillance that is “beyond big brother” where ordinary people are involved in surveillance on 
themselves and the people around them. Foucault’s (1977) work on Jeremy Bentham’s 
Panopticon prison is cited by many of these scholars as a description of the present state of 
people engaging in surveillance on themselves and each other (Zuboff, 1984; Turkle, 2011; 
Young, 2012; Lyon, 2018). This occurs through three types of real time data: (1) active self-
tracking; (2) passive self-tracking through devices; and (3) data capture through the internet of 
things. Active self-tracking may take the form of user generated data through social media or 
wearable technology. Passive self-tracking occurs through “digital exhaust” or “breadcrumbs” 
left through the use of “leaky apps”, loyalty cards and browser histories. Data capture from the 
internet of things may involve tracking through smart televisions, smart electricity meters, smart 
appliances or smart cars and smart cities that read the movements and activity of persons.  Lyon 
(2018) draws attention to the “the Big Five” corporations of Facebook, Apple, Google, 
Microsoft, and Amazon as being the largest sources of surveillance. These corporations are 
engaged in social sorting for the purpose of profits and control. With the growth and 
development of “Big Data” and data analytics, corporations and governments are taking control 
and manipulating consumers and citizens. Rosenfeld identifies part of this process as friction 
which refers to “the commodification of identities through the movement of personal data over 
the web” (2015, p. 93). Here friction and the development of a false consciousness through 
advertising and propaganda mount attacks on human agency, and on the person.  
Through active and passive tracking of “data exhaust” or digital traces of online and real-life 
activity, governments control their citizens and corporations exploit their marketable and 
surveillance potential for the control of consumers (Rosenfeld, 2015). Rosenfeld further states 
that “corporations are using big data to move toward their utopian marketing ideal of sales 
predictability. Through this, a guaranteed consumer would be created, a captive citizen stripped 
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of individual agency” (2015, p. 103, italics added). In light of this grab for power through 
surveillance, Lyon states that “[p]ersonhood is crucially important and needs to be asserted and 
struggled for at every level” (2018, p. 179).   
Calling on Charles Taylor’s (1991b) malaises of modernity, Willson (2006) identifies the rise of 
individualism, the primacy of instrumental reason, and diminished community political 
participation as being fostered by contemporary digital living. Rosenfeld (2015) is also critical of 
this neo-liberal influence on culture, education and identity and raises concerns against 
surveillance along with a call for counter surveillance. Jonathan Zittrain (2008) has become a 
leading data activist, one who calls on everyone to become data activists.  In particular, he calls 
on everyone to stand up against proprietary interests and for net neutrality in order to enhance a 
generative and open internet. Likewise, Young (2012) raises issues over data ownership and 
calls for data portability, where data is owner-controlled, much like what occurs with ethical 
standards for scientific research.  Lyon (2018) additionally calls for data activism in the pursuit 
of fairness and justice for persons to become digital citizens, taking responsibility and making 
claims for their rights of control over their digital data.  He suggests four possible ways forward: 
(1) for individuals to develop their own Privacy Enhancing Technologies (PETs), (2) for 
enhanced governmental regulation, (3) for the mobilization of action groups (i.e., civil liberties), 
and (4) engagement in open discussion of surveillance imaginaries and practices along with an 
ethical seriousness to examine the use of data exhaust.  In doing so, we need to notice the wider 
contexts of small scale experiences of surveillance and how emerging surveillance imaginaries 
and practices relate to actual ethical and political responsibilities; remaining cognizant that the 
attitudes and actions of users can make a difference (Lyon, 2018).   
Rosenfeld (2015) reminds us that the internet has promoted both hegemonic and anti-hegemonic 
forces and that education must play a crucial role in teaching critical understanding and best uses 
of technology. While corporations and governments strive to control, cyber-activists work to 
emancipate persons from the false consciousness and ‘imprisonment’ of persons by hegemonic 
powers. The internet and digital technology can be used to enslave and control, but they can also 
be used to emancipate and become a medium of personal and collective action.  
In closing, digital technology has been shown to foster many changes and developments of the 
self and person in contemporary times, however, James’ theoretical framework of the self is still 
very recognizable and relevant today. 
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